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Most definitions of the nation emphasize notions like common sentiment, 
community, or collective identity. In Benedict Anderson's famous phrase, the nation is 
an "imagined political community," one that is "always conceived as a deep, historical 
comradeship."1 2 Anthony Smith defines the nation as "a named human population 
sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public 
culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members." He 
equates his conception with "a cultural and political bond, uniting in a single 
community all who share an historic culture and homeland."3
1 1 am thankful for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article by the late Herbert Feith, Aleksandar 
Pavkovic', Gregory Acciaioli, James Siegel, Marcus Mietzner, and Sidney Jones. Any errors remain my 
responsibility.
This article will be incorporated in a volume to be edited by Vivienne Wee, tentatively entitled 
Political Fault-lines in Southeast Asia: Movements for Alternative Sovereignty in Nation-States, to be 
published by Routledge.
2 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, 2nd ed. 
(London: Verso, 1991), pp. 5, 7.
3 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991) pp. 14-15.
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In its very early usage, the term "nation" was not linked to political control over 
territory.4 This changed over time, especially during the nineteenth century, so that 
nationalism became, according to Ernest Gellner, "primarily a principle which holds 
that the political and national unit should be congruent."5 The chief aim of a modem 
nationalist movement, therefore, and what distinguishes such a movement from one 
representing some other kind of identity group, is that it aims for a state of its own.6 
This is the case both for national groups which imagine themselves as occupying the 
entire territory of an existing internationally recognized political unit (as with most 
anti-colonial nationalisms) and for secessionist nationalist groups which seek to break 
away from larger states. At the point which nationalism aspires for statehood, it steps 
from the realm of imagination and collective identity into the domain of the 
international system of states. Each nationalist movement is required to enter into 
dialogue with that system and stake a claim for equal representation within it.
A nationalist movement therefore needs to do more than assert its own sense of 
separate collective identity. Collective identity, after all, is possessed by all manner of 
sub-national minority groups. In the international system, the currency is not bonds of 
solidarity, sentiment, and community, but sovereignty, a concept which is at least as 
old as nationalism. Sovereign equality of all states, within which is embodied the 
principle of the inviolability and territorial integrity of each state, remains the bedrock 
of the international system. In order to gain rightful entry into the international system, 
each nationalist movement must therefore make a case for claiming sovereignty of its 
own. The dominant means by which such movements have done so over the last 
century has been by relying on the doctrine of self-determination, which, especially 
since the high period of decolonization after World War II, has been a core constitutive 
principle of the international system.
Since the mid-1980s, however, observers have drawn attention to the ways by 
which the system of nation-states, founded on the concept of sovereignty, has been 
challenged and undermined by the many processes collectively known as globalization. 
Flows of capital, information, and labor across national borders increasingly confound 
attempts at regulation by national governments, while state authorities have 
transferred responsibilities upward to a range of international or supranational bodies. 
New forms of global political, social, and civic organization have emerged, which no 
longer take single nation-states as their reference points. New global norms, such as 
those associated with the doctrine of universal human rights, present themselves as 
competitors to the classical doctrine of sovereignty, explicitly challenging the nation­
state's claim to be the source of supreme political authority. Even if state sovereignty 
remains a basic organizing principle of the international system, many authors argue 
that the vague outlines of an historically novel global order are now apparent.7
4 Liah Greenfield, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University 
Press, 1992), pp. 4-8.
5 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 1.
6 This is not to deny that some recent movements which call themselves nationalist and claim forms of 
sovereignty (such as some movements of indigenous peoples in North America and Australasia) do not 
aspire to independent territorial states.
7 See for example, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard 
University Press, 2000).
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The purpose of this article is to examine how this evolving international context 
has molded the nationalism of the secessionist movement in Aceh. It is argued that the 
nationalist claims made, and the national identity promoted, by the Acehnese 
independence movement have to a large degree been shaped by the movement's 
interaction with the international system. This is because each nation, including the 
putative Acehnese one, is not only constituted "internally" (by constructing a shared 
sense of identity among the participants in the nation), but also "externally" (by 
asserting the nation-state's legitimate participation in the international system). 
Virtually every element in the Acehnese nationalist appeal plays a dual role and is 
directed at both an international and a domestic audience. In particular, this essay will 
demonstrate that nationalist constructions of history, usually depicted in theoretical 
literature on nationalism as having primarily domestic concerns (the inculcation of 
national pride in the population, the establishment of national social cohesion, 
legitimation of national institutions, and the like) can also be profoundly influenced by 
interaction with the international system. The Acehnese nationalist interpretation of 
history has been especially influenced by the attempt to fashion Aceh's claim to 
independence within the dominant international idiom of sovereignty and self- 
determination. In more recent years, processes associated with globalization have also 
influenced Acehnese nationalism. Strengthening universal human rights discourse in the 
international arena has partially changed the way in which independence demands are 
formulated. This discourse, combined with the influence of an emergent global civil 
society, has also produced the first hints of a post-nationalist imagination of politics 
in Aceh.
Origins of Acehnese Nationalism
Acehnese nationalism, at least in its modem form, is a relatively recent historical 
phenomenon, and one that has emerged primarily as a reaction to the activities of the 
Indonesian state. It is true that the sultanate of Aceh was a significant force in the 
Malacca straits for several centuries, especially during its high point under Sultan 
Iskandar Muda in the early seventeenth century. Although much diminished by the 
mid-nineteenth century, the sultanate was once again a considerable power, in large 
part due to the booming pepper trade. Even at this point, however, the sultanate was 
a loosely organized polity, which did not constitute a territorial nation-state in the 
modem sense.8 Nevertheless, the full-scale assault launched by the Dutch in 1873 
provoked strong resistance and resulted in one of the most protracted and costly wars 
of colonial expansion in Southeast Asia. In 1903, Aceh's last Sultan, Muhammad 
Daud, surrendered, and by 1910 the Dutch had more or less consolidated their control 
over the territory. Violent but sporadic resistance persisted until the end of the Dutch 
period. During the 1945-49 Indonesian independence struggle, the vast bulk of the 
anti-colonial Acehnese religious and political leadership identified with the Indonesian 
Republican cause, and no significant voices were raised in the territory in favor of 
Acehnese independence. Even before the revolution, in the 1930s and early 1940s, 
when there was an upsurge of Islamic reformism and Acehnese revivalism in the 
territory, "the idea of Acehnese revival [did not] preclude, as such, notions of
8 On the internal organization of the sultanate, see James T. Siegel, The Rope of God (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 35-47.
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overarching Indonesian unity."9 This makes the Acehnese experience quite distinct 
from, for example, the experiences of Bangsamoro and Karen nationalists, whose 
objections to union with the Philippines and Burma were raised either prior to, or 
shortly after, independence.
Nevertheless, once independence was attained, it proved difficult to maintain the 
unified vision of an Indonesian nation which had been achieved during the anti­
colonial struggle. New tensions arose partly because Indonesian national identity had 
been formed in opposition to Dutch rule, and once alien overlordship was removed, 
conflicting ideas of how the nation should be constituted came into increasingly open 
competition. This was most evident in the Indonesia-wide conflict, particularly acute 
in Aceh, over whether Islam or Pancasila should constitute the ideological basis of the 
new state. Tensions also flowed from the competing political logics of nation- and 
state-building. Immediately following the transfer of sovereignty, the leaders of 
Indonesia's national government moved to assert their authority throughout the 
archipelago, embarking upon a program of state-building and partly drawing upon the 
apparatus and personnel of the late Dutch East Indies colonial beamtenstaat. Early 
steps toward centralization of government control, such as Aceh's incorporation 
within the larger province of North Sumatra in August 1950, caused great resentment 
amongst the Acehnese revolutionary leadership. Such regionalist frustrations fused 
with opposition to Jakarta on the question of the basis of the state, resulting in large- 
scale Acehnese participation in the Darul Islam (House of Islam) revolt in the 1950s. 
The rebels in Aceh maintained links with similar movements in West Java and Southern 
Sulawesi. Their explicit aim was to insure that the Indonesian state was based on 
Islam or, as Morris puts it, to insure that the "center was constituted as representative 
of the revolutionary heritage."10 In 1958, even Hasan di Tiro, who two decades later 
established the secessionist Free Aceh Movement, published a book entitled Democracy 
for Indonesia, in which he argued in favor of an ethno-federal Indonesia, with Islam as 
its unifying cultural foundation.11
After the establishment of the Suharto government in the late 1960s, increasing 
authoritarianism and centralization ended early hopes that Aceh would exercise 
considerable autonomy under the "Special Territory" arrangements worked out to 
resolve the Darul Islam revolt. During the 1970s, large-scale mineral extraction projects 
(especially in the Arun natural gas field) formed enclaves within an overwhelmingly 
agrarian society and aroused resentment that Aceh's natural riches were being 
exploited to benefit "Java."12 In the background, the universalization of the nation­
state system from the 1950s itself popularized the notion of a separate and sovereign 
state as the ultimate prize for every ethnic identity group worth its salt. These 
processes resulted in the formation of an, at first tiny, secessionist movement, Gerakan
9 Eric Eugene Morris, Islam and Politics in Aceh: A Study of Center-Periphery Relations in Indonesia (PhD 
dissertation, Cornell University, 1983), p. 88.
10 Morris, Islam and Politics in Aceh, p. 175.
11 Hasan Muhammad Tiro, Demokrasi Untuk Indonesia (Jakarta: Teplok Press, 1999).
12 Tim Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion 1989-1992 (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1995),
P- 22.
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Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free Aceh Movement) in 1976.13 The organization's leader was 
Hasan di Tiro, a descendant of a family of leading ulama who played a prominent role 
in the struggle against the Dutch. Subsequent rounds of indiscriminate military 
repression in the late 1970s, and especially from 1989 to the early 1990s, greatly 
deepened Acehnese alienation from the Indonesian state and increased popular 
support for secession.14 The fruits of these policies became evident in the two years 
following the May 1998 resignation of President Suharto, with the rapid growth of a 
peaceful movement for self-determination among Acehnese youth and students, 
exemplified in organizations like SIRA (Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh, Aceh 
Referendum Information Center). Their popular appeal was demonstrated by a series 
of massive pro-referendum demonstrations in several Acehnese towns, including the 
provincial capital, Banda Aceh, in November 1999. During the same period, GAM 
dramatically expanded the scale and geographical scope of its insurgency. Indonesian 
security forces, despite early promises of a change of approach, quickly reverted to 
dirty war practices, policies that accelerated the region's descent into violence from 
early 1999. By mid-2001, a virtual state of war existed through much of the territory.
As should be clear from the preceding summary, contemporary Acehnese 
nationalism is primarily reactive in character. Not only did it emerge in response to the 
depredations of the Indonesian state, but the particular construction of Acehnese 
national identity promoted by GAM and similar nationalist groups was itself 
produced by a process of interaction with, and explicit differentiation from, official 
Indonesian representations of Indonesian national identity.15 Thus, one finds in GAM 
materials an emphasis on an ancient and glorious Acehnese past, which is deliberately 
counterpoised to the allegedly recent and inauthentic history of Indonesia, as well as a 
celebration of an immutable Acehnese ethnic identity, which is contrasted to an 
inherently fraudulent Indonesian-ness, depicted as little more than a front for Javanese 
dominance. This essay does not attempt to rebut the standard depiction of Acehnese 
secessionist nationalism as arising in response to the activities of the Indonesian state. 
Instead, its aim is to add an extra dimension to our understanding of Acehnese 
nationalism by discussing the constitutive impact that the international context has 
had on it.
The International Setting: Sovereignty, Self-determination, and the Challenge of 
Globalization
Acehnese nationalists base their claims for independence on a core principle of the 
modern nation-state era: the right of self-determination. This right is widely 
proclaimed to be a universal principle, indeed a foundation stone, of the international 
order. Since the consolidation of the UN system, secessionist movements of all
13 The official name of this organization is the ASNLF, or Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front. It is 
more widely known within Aceh by its Indonesian acronym, however, and for ease of reference, this usage 
is adopted in this essay.
14 Kell, Roots of Acehnese Rebellion; Geoffrey Robinson, "Rowan is as Rowan does: The Origins of Disorder 
in New Order Aceh," Indonesia 66 (1998): 127-156.
15 For an argument to this effect see Edward Aspinall, "Modernity, History and Ethnicity: Indonesian and 
Acehnese nationalism in conflict," forthcoming in Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs.
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description have routinely made it the centerpiece of their claims for separate 
statehood.16 However, the application of the principle over the past half century has 
been greatly confused and subject to important limits.
The modem conception of the right of self-determination is commonly thought to 
have arisen from the growth and spread of nationalism in the nineteenth century, 
especially in East and Central Europe. At that time, the core aim of nationalism was 
the acquisition of a sovereign and independent state for each self-defined national 
group within the great multi-ethnic empires: "a state for every nation and all the nation 
in one state," as the adage put it. The right to national self-determination is also 
commonly viewed as having grown out of the concurrent spread of the democratic 
ideal, based as it was on the notion that "the people" should be the final source of 
political legitimacy and should be free to decide their government and, by implication, 
the polity to which they belonged. After World War I, the Wilsonian doctrine of self- 
determination was primarily aimed at resolving the nationalities problem in the areas 
governed by the Central Powers and was not intended to apply to the colonial empires 
of the victors. In the aftermath of World War II, however, the scope of the doctrine was 
extended greatly, as the dismantling of the colonial empires began and the nation-state 
system extended across almost the entire globe. The UN Charter embedded the 
concept of the right of self-determination in the decolonization process, declaring that 
"all peoples have the right to national self-determination." Since that time, the right 
has attained some recognition in international law and come to occupy its current 
position as an axiom in the creed of every anti-colonial and secessionist movement.
From the start, despite the claims of universality, the exercise of the right to self- 
determination has been subject to very significant limits. In particular, there has never 
been recognition of a general right to secession from sovereign states. This is partly 
because respect for territorial integrity is itself central to the notion of sovereign 
equality of states, and hence to the whole international system.17 Hostility to secession 
also derives from the more practical fear that an unfettered right of secession would 
give rise to an anarchic and potentially endless process of disintegration of the world's 
many multi-ethnic states. Historically, the most important limitation has been in the 
definition of what constitutes the "self" in self-determination: which groups are 
properly defined as the "people" to which the right applies? In response to this 
question, self-determination has been closely linked to the struggle against 
colonialism.18 In the dominant UN interpretation, with few exceptions, groups who 
constituted a "people" for the purposes of self-determination were the inhabitants of 
colonies.
16 For example, assertion of the right of self-determination was a common theme in the various declarations 
of independence which brought about the end of Yugoslavia. See Aleksandar Pavkovic', "Recursive 
Secessions in Former Yugoslavia: Too Hard a Case for Theories of Secession?," Political Studies 48 (2000): 
485-502.
17 Ruth Lapidoth, "Sovereignty in Transition," Journal of International Affairs 45,2 (1992): 325-346, esp. 
339.
18 Allen Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede," Journal of International Affairs 45,2 
(1992): 347-366, esp. 348. One of the first formulations of a "right" of peoples to self-determination 
appeared in the UN General Assembly Resolution on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, thus linking the concept to the decolonization process. See Michael Freeman, "Democracy and 
Dynamite: the Peoples' Right to Self-determination," Political Studies 44 (1996): 746-761, esp. 747-748.
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An important corollary of this interpretation imposes a rigid territorial limit on the 
definition of a "people": self-determination was only for peoples located within the 
boundaries of existing states or colonies. As Bartkus writes:
As the specific right of colonial peoples, the "self" of self-determination was 
restricted to colonial administrative units, despite their arbitrarily delimited 
territorial boundaries and despite the fact that many of these units had a greater 
variety of communities than the Austro-Hungarian Empire ever contended with.19
In part, this approach flowed from the historic association of sovereignty with states; 
in the old world of sovereign dynastic states, "The members of international society 
were . . . the sovereign states, not their populations."20 The result was an elision 
between the categories of "people" and "state": a new (independent) state may 
succeed to and thereby replace an old (colonial) one, but with very few exceptions, the 
new states produced by decolonization adhered to colonial boundaries. Thus, "self- 
determination" has had little to do with "peoples" or "nations," understood as 
collectivities believing that they shared a common history, language, culture, or national 
destiny. As we shall see, this dominant interpretation of the doctrine of self- 
determination impels concepts of sovereignty and state succession to the center of the 
secessionist agenda.
From the start there were exceptions, although almost always with the consent of 
the states involved. During the process of decolonization itself, there were cases where 
colonial borders were not sacrosanct (for example Cameroon or India). Even during the 
Cold War, when the great powers were reluctant to open the Pandora's box of 
secession, there were several cases of successful secession or state partition (Senegal 
from Mali in 1960, Singapore from the Malaysian Federation in 1965, and Bangladesh 
from Pakistan in 1971). In the past decade, there have been even more cases of 
successful secession: the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and the 
founding of Eritrea (1993), Slovakia (1993) and, arguably, East Timor.
In some such cases (Bangladesh, Yugoslavia, Slovakia), the newly independent 
states could not justifiably be described as successor states to historical sovereign 
states or colonial units. Even so, the international consensus has continued to deny a 
generalized right of secession. For example, following declarations of independence by 
Slovenia and Croatia, a commission established by the European Community 
restrictively interpreted Yugoslavia's breakdown as the dissolution of a federal system, 
whereby the constituent federal units were freed to go their separate ways. By doing 
so, even if this interpretation was difficult to square with the facts, the commission 
studiously avoided acknowledging a general right of secession.21
The classical concepts of sovereignty and self-determination might well appear in 
retrospect to have reached their apogee during the Cold War, as many writers on 
globalization have argued. Two phenomena associated with globalization constitute 
particularly direct challenges to state sovereignty and have had a significant impact on
19 Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamic of Secession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 11.
20 James Mayall, "Sovereignty, Nationalism and Self-determination," Political Studies 47 (1999): 474-502, 
esp. 476.
21 Pavkovic', "Recursive Secessions," pp. 485-86.
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nationalism in Aceh. The first, the doctrine of universal human rights, has been 
important in the international arena for the last fifty years, but has been especially 
influential since the mid-1980s. Set down in the UN Declaration of Human Rights 
during the birth of the modem era of the universal nation-state, the concept of 
universal human rights has since been elaborated into a formidable "normative 
architecture" and has become embedded within a rapidly evolving system of 
international humanitarian law.22 Especially in the wake of the end of the Cold War, 
human rights issues have increasingly permeated the public discourse of international 
relations and the policies of states, although, as we know too well, they have not yet 
dominated them. The concept of universal human rights shares Enlightenment origins 
with nationalism, for these two ideas are linked in part by the concept of popular 
sovereignty. However, recent experience indicates that human rights discourse and 
practice may, indeed must, come into conflict with the nationalist impulse and the 
defense of sovereignty. In part, this happens because of the exclusionary logic of ethnic 
(and other) nationalisms, which legitimate coercive action against those who are 
deemed to threaten the authenticity of the national community or the integrity of the 
state. Human rights doctrines challenge the nation-state by laying down universal 
standards which claim to transcend all defenses leased on state sovereignty, unique 
national identity, or national interest. As Sikkink argues, "international human rights 
norms question state rule over society and national sovereignty" and thus "offer 
particularly potent challenges to the central logic of a system of sovereign states."23
The growing influence of universal human rights, plus the proliferation of actual 
cases of state dissolution since the end of the Cold War, have combined to challenge 
theory on self-determination. Hence for example, Kofman suggests that some 
"territorial groups with historical-cultural identities" should be granted a qualified 
right to secede, provided that they "cannot be aiming to deprive the former state of its 
most important resource base, and they must be willing to respect the individual and 
cultural rights of their own minorities . . . "24 Similarly, Buchanan argues that there 
should be a limited right of secession in cases of "discriminatory redistribution" or 
where there are genuine threats of cultural extinction which could not be remedied by a 
lesser measure.25 Freeman notes that one of the most common grounds for arguing in 
favor of extending the right of secession is "the remedial theory of secession" which 
associates "the right of secession with the right to resist tyranny."26 In this view, 
oppression is the "necessary condition for the right of secession."27
The second element of globalization considered in this article, itself related to the 
growth of the international human rights regime, is the appearance of new kinds of
22 Richard A. Falk, Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 54.
23 Kathryn Sikkink, 'Transnational politics, international relations theory, and human rights: a new model 
of international politics is needed to explain the politics of human rights," PS: Political Science and Politics 
31,3 (1998): 517-521, esp. 517.
24 Daniel Kofman, "Rights of secession," Society 35,5 (1998): 30-37, esp. 37.
25 Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede," p. 354.
26 Freeman, "Democracy and Dynamite," p. 753.
27 See also Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-determination (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1978).
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transnational organizations, collectively constituting an emergent global civil society. 
These networks, particularly those associated with the major human rights non­
governmental organizations (NGOs), play a crucial role as sites for the development 
and inculcation of new human rights norms and in modifying "the conflictual nature of 
socially constructed anarchy" embedded in the Westphalian system.28 By promoting 
universal norms, maintaining transnational institutional forms, and campaigning across 
national borders, such organizations themselves have the potential to undermine or 
challenge the core principles of the nation-state system, including state sovereignty. 
The Acehnese experience suggests that global civil society networks may play a direct 
role in seeking to moderate conflict between rival nationalisms with mutually 
incompatible claims for sovereignty.
The International Structuring of Acehnese Nationalism
Like participants in all secessionist movements, Acehnese nationalists make many 
appeals for international support. This is not surprising, given that, except in cases 
where the state which encased the secessionist minority has acceded to separation (as 
Czechoslovakia did in the case of Slovakia, for example), the only secessionist 
movements that have proven successful are those that benefited from international 
support, either in the form of military backing (from India in the case of Bangladesh) or 
in the form of swift recognition of claims for statehood (from the US and European 
countries in the case of the former Yugoslav republics).29 Even where secessionist 
movements exercise effective control over all or most of the territory to which they lay 
claim (and for a period in 1999-2001 GAM did control large swathes of the Acehnese 
countryside), this counts for little in the absence of formal recognition of statehood and 
entry into the community of nation-states via appropriate UN mechanisms.
From the start, Hasan di Tiro and other GAM leaders appreciated the need to 
attain international support and recognition. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, they 
argued strongly for international recognition of Acehnese sovereignty. Ignored by the 
Western powers and influenced by the Cold War context of the time, they adopted a 
sometimes strident third-worldist, anti-imperialist tone, describing Indonesia as a 
neocolonial tool for the exploitation of the natural resources of Aceh and other parts of 
the archipelago. This was the period when foreign investment was flooding back into 
Indonesia after the overthrow of Sukarno government; Aceh attracted major 
investments in gas and timber. In the 1970s, GAM combatants mounted operations
28 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 21, 3 (1992): 389-420, esp. p. 390.
29 For an argument that international recognition was the crucial factor in the Yugoslav dissolution, see 
Raju G. C. Thomas, "Self-determination and international recognition policy: an alternative interpretation 
of why Yugoslavia disintegrated," World Affairs 160,1 (1997): 17-33.
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against foreign companies operating in the province.30 In the 1980s, GAM turned to 
Libya for support at a time when Colonel Gaddafi was promoting himself as the new 
international leader of all manner of national liberation movements; several hundred 
GAM members eventually received military training in that country.
In the post-Cold War era of "humanitarian intervention," Acehnese nationalists 
have been far more hopeful about the possibility of gaining support from the UN and 
the major powers (especially the US), and have reoriented their attentions accordingly. 
Appeals for international assistance or intervention have become central to the 
demands of almost every civil society or political group in Aceh, except for those with 
links to the government. Many groups have focused on encouraging international 
human rights bodies to take an interest in Aceh, in order to restrain Indonesian security 
forces from abusing the civilian population.31 Especially after President Habibie 
promised East Timor a referendum on independence, calls for the UN to organize a 
similar process in Aceh became central to the agenda of many Acehnese groups (most 
notably SIRA). At times, activists have adopted creative methods of furthering this 
campaign, such as the coordinated attempts to fly UN rather than Indonesian flags en 
masse through Acehnese territory on the anniversary of Indonesian independence in 
August 2000.32 In recent years, almost every public statement made by even relatively 
junior GAM field commanders—and innumerable such statements are reported by the 
Acehnese and North Sumatran-based press—includes a call for international 
recognition or intervention of some kind.
The appeal for international support is more than a mere tactical device. It can 
itself be an assertion of national status (along the lines of "we are as important as any 
other nation-state and demand equal recognition"). At the same time, awareness of an 
international audience has left a distinct and important imprint on the discourse of the 
various pro-independence groups, even on their very conceptualization of Acehnese 
identity.
Indonesian Control as Colonialism
One core feature of Acehnese nationalist discourse is its characterization of 
Indonesian rule as colonial. This theme is particularly prominent in writings and 
statements by leaders of GAM, but it also routinely appears in material linked to 
newer youth and student-led self-determination organizations like SIRA. In materials 
produced by such groups, the Indonesian government is routinely characterized as the 
"Javanese colonial government" (pemerintah penjajah Jawa: this or some close equivalent 
tends to be the favored choice for GAM), or the "neo-colonial Indonesian government" 
(such terms being more commonly used by younger activists). Indonesian "colonialism" 
is depicted as having a cultural dimension (as it propagates "Javanese" cultural 
values, for example by the transmigration program), an economic dimension (as it 
exploits Aceh's natural resources for the benefit of "Java"), and a political dimension
30 For Hasan di Tiro's account of such operations and the justification for them, see his The Price of 
Freedom (The Unfinished Diary) (Norsborg: Information Department, National Liberation Front Acheh 
Sumatra, 1981), pp. 168-171,195-196.
31 See for example, "'Ganjalan' Penyelesaian Pelanggaran HAM," Kontras, May 23- 29,2001.
32 "Soal Merah-Putih, Siapapun jangan Memaksa, Bendera PBB tak Boleh Berkibar," Serambi Indonesia, 
August 16, 2000.
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(since "Javanese" dominate the bureaucracy and Armed Forces). Those Acehnese who 
work for the Indonesian state are likewise commonly described as servants or lackeys 
(antek) of colonialism.33
GAM uses the reference to colonialism in order to justify violent resistance against 
the Indonesian state in language derived from international law. As GAM 
spokesperson for the Peureulak region, Ishak Daud, put it after one attack on a 
military convoy:
As a colonized nation, [the Acehnese] are granted the right by the UN to resist 
the colonialists by all means, including by using arms. Because colonialism is 
viewed as an international crime . . . We request that all civilized nations, 
particularly the members of the UN, obey UN resolutions. Because therein it is 
said that all member nations of the UN are obliged to finish off the colonialists. 
They also prohibit anyone whatsoever from using violence against those nations 
which are struggling for their freedom.34
The description of Indonesian control as colonial in nature is partly directed at an 
internal Acehnese audience and is intended to instill a sense of continuity with past 
struggles against the Dutch. However, as the above quotation suggests, it also partly 
aims to shape Acehnese demands in accordance with international norms of self- 
determination, given that self-determination has been historically linked to 
decolonization. As Benyamin Neuberger outlines (with particular reference to 
movements in Africa), secessionist movements habitually equate their demands for 
separate statehood with struggles against colonial rule, describing their oppressors as 
imperialists and themselves as engaged in anticolonial struggle. The aim, clearly, is to 
"base their claims on a universally legitimized principle of national self- 
determination. "35
However, Neuberger also notes that such claims typically fail to resonate in the 
international community and lack validity in international law. This happens, he 
points out, because the UN has effectively accepted what are often disparagingly 
referred to as the "saltwater" and "pigmentation" definitions of colonies. The first 
holds that for control to be deemed colonial, the colony must be separated from the 
imperial power by ocean, the second that the colonial power must be a different racial 
group (usually European) from those colonized. The UN has thus defined a colony as 
an entity that is "geographically separate and distinct ethnically and/or culturally 
from the country administering it."36
Partly in response to this objection, Acehnese nationalists historicize "Indonesian 
colonialism" by depicting it as a continuation of Dutch rule, and by describing their 
own struggle as an extension of opposition to the Dutch. This view is part of an 
argument which, since the 1976 formation of GAM, has occupied a central place in the 
movement's demands for international recognition. This is the argument that a
33 See for example, "DPRD Tidak Bermanfaat," Serambi Indonesia, May 10,2001.
34 "GAM Serang Konvoi Reo di Aceh Timur," Serambi Indonesia, May 15,2001.
35 Ralph Benyamin Neuberger, National Self-Determination in Postcolonial Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Reinner Publishers, 1986), p. 90.
36 Ibid., p. 84.
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contemporary independent Aceh (an entity that GAM leaders claim has had de jure 
existence since Hasan di Tiro's "re-declaration" of independence in 1976) is a 
successor state to the nineteenth-century Sultanate.
Acehnese History and the Successor State Idea
Secessionist movements frequently justify their claims to self-determination by 
constructing ethno-histories of independent statehood stretching back to antiquity.37 
Acehnese nationalism has a particularly marked atavistic element of this sort. Writings 
and statements by, and published interviews with, GAM leaders are full of references 
to the golden age of the Acehnese Sultanate, especially under the seventeenth-century 
Sultan Iskandar Muda, and to the nineteenth-century anti-Dutch war. Once again, such 
claims are partly directed inward and are aimed at constructing a nationalist 
constituency within Aceh. By presenting an image of a glorious, ancient, and 
independent Acehnese state and its pernicious subjugation by Dutch and Indonesians, 
Acehnese nationalists such as Hasan di Tiro strive to "awaken" current generations of 
Acehnese to the responsibilities bequeathed to them by their forebears.38
The references to history are also intended, however, to establish a legal basis for 
independent statehood in the language of international law. GAM leaders routinely 
argue that an independent Aceh (as represented by their own organization) is the 
successor, indeed the continuation, of the precolonial Acehnese Sultanate. There are at 
least three distinct steps in the argument.
The first step is to show that the Acehnese Sultanate was a legitimate sovereign 
actor in the international state system. This is not a problematic proposition for 
Acehnese nationalists to establish, and they routinely emphasize events like the 
dispatch of ambassadors by the Sultanate to European and other states, statements 
by foreign heads of state giving recognition to Acehnese sovereignty, and the treaties 
entered into by Aceh. Prominent among these is the 1819 treaty negotiated between the 
sultanate and Sir Stamford Raffles. It is on the basis of the latter that Hasan di Tiro 
has gone on the record suggesting that an independent Aceh might choose to become a 
member of the British Commonwealth.39
The second step is to establish that the initial assault on the Acehnese Sultanate 
and the subsequent attempt to incorporate it into the Dutch East Indies was illegal. 
The key date here is 1873, when the Dutch issued a formal declaration of war and 
invaded Aceh (although they took several decades to subdue the territory). Acehnese 
nationalists, especially but not exclusively those associated with GAM, argue that this 
Dutch attack on Aceh amounted to an illegal annexation similar to Indonesia's 1975 
annexation of East Timor. They also note the positions taken by various foreign 
powers at this point, especially the official neutrality adopted by the United States. In 
short, Acehnese nationalists attempt to ground their claim on what Buchanan calls the
37 Smith, National Identity, pp. 126-127; Neuberger, National Self-Determination, pp. 42-52.
38 For more discussion of Acehnese historical claims, see Gerry van Klinken, "The Battle for History after 
Suharto: Beyond Sacred Dates, Great Men, and Legal Milestones," Criticial Asian Studies 33,3 (2001): 323- 
350, esp. 337-340; Aspinall, "Modernity, History and Ethnicity."
39 "Saya Ingin Aceh Jadi Commonwealth Inggris," Forum Keadilan, April 2,2000, pp. 78-81.
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principle of "rectificatory justice/' whereby "secession is simply the reappropriation, 
by the legitimate owners, of stolen property."40
However, in order to establish the application of this principle to contemporary 
Aceh, GAM leaders must take a third, more difficult, step. This requires them to prove 
that Aceh's incorporation into the Netherlands East Indies and Indonesia never 
became legally valid. To make this point, they argue that Aceh was never defeated by 
the Dutch and that a state of war between Aceh and the Netherlands East Indies 
continued until the Dutch were forced to leave Aceh in 1942. Then, the argument 
continues, at the 1949 Round Table conference in The Hague, Holland transferred 
sovereignty (which it did not legally possess) over Aceh to the new colonizer, 
Indonesia. This transfer of sovereignty was an illegal act upon which Indonesian claims 
to Aceh now rest.41
In order to bolster this argument, Acehnese nationalist accounts must 
systematically reinterpret a range of episodes in Acehnese history which in standard 
Indonesian accounts validate Acehnese incorporation into the Netherlands East Indies 
and Indonesia. For example, although Dutch officials early last century usually spoke 
of the "pacification" of Aceh, some Dutch and Indonesian accounts also suggest that 
the Acehnese surrendered to the Dutch, effectively legalizing the latter's control over 
Acehnese territory.42 GAM spokespeople deny that this was the case. They argue that 
either after or before the surrender of the Sultan Tuanku Muhammad Daud Shah in 
1903, the mandate of xvali negara (guardian or head of state) passed to the family of 
the famous ulama Tengku Chik Di Tiro Muhammad Saman, the great-grandfather of 
Hasan di Tiro, and that Hasan di Tiro has himself inherited this mandate.43 They 
similarly argue that Aceh was not legally incorporated into Indonesia when the latter 
achieved independence in 1945-49. They do this by challenging accepted Indonesian
40 Buchanan, "Self-Determination," p. 353.
41A chief source for these arguments is Tiro, The Price of Freedom, esp. pp. 24-25, but they can be found in 
numerous other writings and statements by GAM leaders. See for example, "Pemyataan Teuku 
Hidayatullah M dari Markas GAM," Kompas, August 12,1999, in which a GAM leader from North Aceh 
writes of the "Sovereignty of the State of Aceh which was seized illegally by the Dutch government, and 
then surrendered illegally to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia."
42 See for example comments by University of Gadjah Mada historian Ibrahim Alfian "Aceh Merdeka, 
Hasan Tiro, dan Satu Tafsir Sejarah," Tempo, June 18,2000, pp. 47-50, esp. 50.
43 See for example, comments by Abu Sofyan Daud, vice-Commander of GAM for the Pase district in "Wali 
Nanggroe, Kok bukan Hasan Tiro?," Kontras, July 4-10,2001. Some GAM leaders even assert that the 
mandate of zoali negara passed to Tengku Chik Di Tiro Muhammad Saman in 1874 when Sultan Muhammad 
Daud Shah died, leaving only a twelve-year-old son. This son, however, was himself declared of age in 
1884, and it was he who, as sultan, surrendered to the Dutch in 1903. See Anthony Reid, The Contest for 
North Sumatra: Acheh, the Netherlands and Britain 1858-1898 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 
31. In the GAM view, several of Tengku Chik Di Tiro's male descendants continued as wali negara after this 
point, although they were killed in quick succession by the Dutch. The last was Tengku Chik Ma'at di Tiro, 
Hasan di Tiro's uncle who, as the sixteen-year-old "last Head of State of Free Aceh," was killed on the 
battlefield in 1911. See Tiro, The Price of Freedom, p. 11. Hasan di Tiro's claim to the title of wali negara is 
disputed by opponents, including splinter groups within GAM. Husaini Hasan, for example, argues that 
power was only temporarily transferred to Tengku Chik di Tiro Muhammad Saman, without the transfer of 
a hereditary right to become head of state. Many Acehnese historians agree that there was never a transfer 
of unfettered sovereign power. See "Aceh Merdeka, Hasan Tiro, dan Satu Tafsir Sejarah," Tempo, June 18, 
2000, pp. 47-50, esp. 49.
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interpretations of key historic incidents, like a famous declaration of loyalty to "our 
homeland Indonesia" made by four leading Acehnese ulama on October 15, 1945.44 
Acehnese nationalists contend that this was merely a statement by four individuals, 
with no binding legal authority over the entire population, and that "the integration of 
Aceh [into Indonesia] was done by just a few people, whereas Aceh, as we know, is 
not the property of just a few."45 Acehnese nationalists find it especially problematic 
to deal with the first three decades of Indonesian independence, before secessionist 
aspirations had been publicly voiced and when, even at the height of the Darul Islam 
rebellion, there remained considerable commitment to a united Indonesia among Aceh's 
leaders (including Hasan di Tiro himself, as his 1958 book, "Democracy for 
Indonesia," makes clear). Acehnese nationalists frequently either skim over this period 
or depict it as a period of temporary loss of national consciousness.46 They also 
sometimes attempt to reinterpret this period in the light of current nationalist 
orthodoxy, for example by emphasizing the anti-Jakarta element in Darul Islam and 
obscuring the programmatic distinctions between it and the contemporary insurgency.
By such methods, Acehnese nationalists depict Indonesian rule as, legally, a 
continuation of Dutch rule. In the early years of GAM, Hasan di Tiro and other leaders 
of the organization used to describe Indonesia as an "invention" of the Dutch and 
other foreign powers, designed to allow continued neocolonial exploitation of the 
archipelago 47 From the early 1990s, when the movement's leaders began to abandon 
anti-"neo-colonial" rhetoric in the interests of gamering Western support, many 
Acehnese nationalists maintained the legal fiction that their conflict was really with 
Holland. In the words of the late commander of the armed wing of GAM, Abdullah 
Syafi'ie: "It is only the government of Holland which has the right to conclude its 
warfare with the Acehnese nation which began on March 2 6 ,1873."48
Such historic claims are partly used to construct national identity for a domestic 
Acehnese audience. In the "unfinished diary" of his sojourn in the mountains of Aceh 
during 1976-79, Hasan di Tiro frequently stresses that the key initial challenge facing 
Acehnese nationalists was to awaken the Acehnese population to their national 
destiny. This, he believed, could be achieved by teaching the people both about 
Acehnese history and about international affairs and international law.49 In the post- 
Suharto period, GAM leaders frequently emphasize Aceh's historically derived legal 
right to independence when making speeches to audiences in Acehnese villages or when 
giving interviews to local newspapers. Exactly the same arguments recur when GAM 
leaders address international audiences, suggesting that they genuinely believe in the 
legality of their claim for independent statehood.50
44 See Syarifuddin Tippe, Aceh di Persimpangan Jalan (Jakarta: Pustaka Cidesindo, 2000), pp. 31-32, for one 
Indonesian nationalist account of this event.
45 Muhammad Nazar, "Pelaksanaan Referendum Aceh; Mengakhiri Konflik Warisan," Suwa 1,1 (2000): 7.
46 For example Tiro, The Price of Freedom, p. 28.
47 Ibid., p. 168.
48 "GAM Tak Mau Gencatan Senjata," Waspada, December 5,1999.
49 Tiro, The Price of Freedom, p. 194.
50 For one example see the following article based on an interview with "Prince" Hasan di Tiro: Arnold 
Beichman, "Destined for Rebellions? Acehnese Independence Cries for Justice," Washington Post, June 18, 
2001.
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The main point to be derived from the preceding discussion is that Acehnese 
nationalist claims, and the nationalist interpretation of Acehnese identity, have been 
shaped through interaction with the international system, even through the process of 
globalization itself. The arguments about Aceh's historical and legal rights to 
independence were largely developed by Hasan di Tiro and other nationalist leaders 
while in exile. Their views reflect the romanticism typical of what Anderson calls the 
long-distance nationalist, as well as the frustrations of those seeking international 
recognition and support.51 Hasan di Tiro himself was in the United States as a member 
of Indonesia's UN delegation when the Darul Islam rebellion broke out, and he 
appointed himself spokesperson for that movement.52 He spent most of the succeeding 
two and half decades in the US, until his secret return to Aceh in 1976, when he 
founded GAM. The GAM leader himself emphasizes the influence on his political 
views of his "about 20 years" training in political science, international law, and 
related topics at American universities, including Columbia and Fordham.53 From the 
1970s, he and his close supporters, who eventually established themselves in Sweden 
after Hasan di Tiro fled Aceh in 1979, expended considerable energy attempting to 
gain entry into major international organizations and to obtain international 
recognition for GAM as the legitimate representative of the Acehnese people. The most 
that they could achieve was access to the outermost fringes of the international system, 
via such bodies as UNPO (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization), and 
they frequently expressed intense bitterness at the indifference of the UN and the 
major powers toward the Acehnese cause.54
The GAM doctrine that designates an independent Aceh as the successor state to 
the old sultanate has some important corollaries. In the first place, it has important 
implications for the form of state to be adopted by an independent Aceh. GAM 
leaders have never presented a clear blueprint of what kind of constitutional system 
will be adopted in Aceh after it achieves independence. In particular, they have made 
few attempts to convince potential overseas sympathizers that a democratic system 
will be put in place. This course of action relates directly to the view held by the 
organization's leaders that there is an unbroken continuity between the nineteenth- 
century status quo ante and the present. This means, among other things, that Hasan di 
Tiro is the legal sovereign and that upon his death his son, Karim, will assume the title 
of wali negara (although there is debate about this second point in GAM circles). It also 
means that, upon achieving de facto independence (as opposed to de jure 
independence, which GAM leaders already claim), the constitutional and political 
structures adopted will be those of the nineteenth-century sultanate. Some GAM 
leaders stress that this does not rule out constitutional reform after independence, 
when consultation with the population can be carried out. This reform, however, is
51 Benedict Anderson, "The New World Disorder," New Left Review 193 (1992): 3-13, esp. 12-13.
52 M. Isa Sulaiman, Aceh Merdeka. ldeologi, Kepemimpinan dan Gerakan (Jakarta Timur: Pustaka Al- 
Kautsar, 2000), pp 12-13.
53 Tiro, The Price of Freedom, pp. 162-63.
54 See for example Hasan di Tiro's speech before the UNPO General Assembly: The New-Colonialism; 
Denominated "Indonesians!" Delivered at The Hague, January 20,1995. Accessed online at
http: /  /acehnet.tripod.com/ colonial.htm.
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relegated to a vague and distant future. In the words of Abu Sofyan Daud, Vice- 
Commander of GAM for the Pase region:
In the future, if Acehnese independence is achieved, the form of state and 
position of head of state can be agreed upon again: whether it will be a 
monarchy, a republic, or something else. Likewise, whether the head of state will 
be held by a sultan, king, wali, or president. That's an agenda for the future, after 
independence is achieved. It will all be up to the people's choice.55
A second corollary has to do with the territorial boundaries of an independent 
Aceh, which this doctrine would draw following the outlines of the sultanate, which 
were and still are vaguely defined. Early on in the history of GAM, Hasan di Tiro 
stated that the "minimum legal claim" for Acehnese territory included all land 
encompassed by the historical boundaries in place at the time of the Dutch attack in 
1873. In his view, these incorporated Bengkulu, Jambi, and the Riau Archipelago, an 
enormous area of Sumatra, including six other present-day Indonesian provinces, far 
exceeding the area inhabited by ethnic Acehnese.56 Indeed, Hasan di Tiro went further, 
claiming sovereignty over the entire island of Sumatra (which after independence 
would be governed as a federation), because "the Southern part of Sumatra was taken 
by the Dutch from Acheh through the process of creeping colonial war prior to March 
26, 1873."57
Contested territorial claims are frequently one of the most problematic aspects of 
atavistic ethno-nationalisms. The wars in the former Yugoslavia amply testify to this, 
as do conflicts in Mindanao, where historical claims based on the suzerainty of the 
Sulu and Maguindanao sultanates are undermined by the contemporary minority 
status of Muslims due to a century of migration by Christian Filipinos. Even in the 
world annals of ethno-nationalism, however, Hasan di Tiro's claims for a vast historic 
Acehnese homeland stand out as notably ambitious. It is true that during the golden 
age of the sultanate's power under Iskandar Muda "royal control was effective over all 
the important ports of the west coast of Sumatra as well as the east coast as far south 
as Asahan."58 But this control consisted essentially of projection of naval power, 
payment of tribute to the Sultanate, and acknowledgment by local rulers of its ultimate 
authority. It was certainly not equivalent to modem notions of state control over 
sovereign territory. In any case, within a few decades of Iskandar Muda's death in 
1636, the sultanate's geographical reach shrank dramatically, so that its maximum 
nineteenth-century claims did not extend far beyond the present-day province of Aceh 
on the west coast, although they did take in much of the adjacent coastal regions of the 
contemporary province of North Sumatra on the east.
Even in the post-Suharto period, there remains considerable uncertainty about the 
extent of Acehnese nationalist territorial claims. GAM spokespersons frequently still 
blur the distinction between "Sumatra" and "Aceh."59 In private, however, some GAM
55 "Otonomi Khusus Berbentuk NAD, Itu bukan Utang," Kontras, July 4-10,2001.
56 Tiro, The Price of Freedom, p. 148.
57 Ibid., p. 149.
58 Reid, Contest for North Sumatra, p. 3.
59 See for example comments by GAM spokesperson for the Peureulak region, Ishak Daud in "GAM Minta 
PBB Segera Selesaikan Masalah Aceh" Waspada, April 30, 2001.
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leaders are ready to concede that they would accept the present provincial borders as 
the boundary of an independent state.60 For this reason, they are vehemently opposed 
to proposals by local elites in some parts of Aceh—such as the predominantly non­
ethnic Acehnese districts of Central Aceh, Southeast Aceh, and Singkil—to break away 
from Aceh and form one or two separate provinces.
In summary, and putting to one side the ambiguity over territorial boundaries, we 
can see that the essence of the claim made by GAM and like-minded Acehnese 
nationalists is for the classical form of sovereignty which came to be embedded in and 
universalized by the United Nations system in the post-World War II years. This 
implies, among other things, judicial equality with other states, inviolability of 
Acehnese territorial integrity, and exclusive power over its own territory. In order to 
achieve this, Acehnese nationalists have felt compelled to construct their claim within 
the accepted idiom of the international system.
To an outsider, it seems obvious that such claims have little chance of recognition 
under international law. Many writers have criticized Hasan di Tiro for the 
"romanticism" of his view of history and Acehnese statehood.61 Gerry van Klinken has 
described it as "purely propagandistic."62 Certainly, established practice in the post- 
World War II order, especially the identification of self-determination with 
decolonization and the adherence to former colonial boundaries, stands hard against 
Acehnese claims. Likewise, whatever Acehnese nationalists may claim about the 
validity of Dutch and Indonesian sovereignty, it is clear that Aceh was 
administratively incorporated into the Dutch East Indies and the modem Indonesian 
Republic, bringing into play the principle that states are assumed to have valid 
sovereignty over territory they control (uti possidetis). Even so, one may sympathize 
with Acehnese nationalists for feeling obliged to make these arguments in an 
international system that provides little space for minorities with aspirations for 
statehood, even those who have been severely repressed by the state from which they 
seek to escape. There is little doubt that, at least in the immediate post-Suharto years, 
a majority of the Acehnese population wishes to be rid of the Indonesian state; senior 
Indonesian officials have occasionally admitted as much.63 Yet the position of the 
Acehnese is completely different in international law from, say, the position of the 
East Timorese, because in the colonial division of Southeast Asia, East Timor was 
colonized by the Portuguese, while for a brief half century the Acehnese were 
vanquished by the Dutch. Also, unlike the East Timorese, who were integrated into 
Indonesia by force, the weight of historical evidence suggests that the majority of 
Acehnese leaders, at least, voluntarily acceded to union with Indonesia in 1945. But 
even if this was the case, should such a voluntary agreement to enter into a state be 
binding for all time?
60 Confidential interviews, January-February 2001.
61 For example, Finngeir Hiorth, "Free Aceh: An Impossible Dream?" Kabar Seberang: Sulating Maphilindo 
17 (1986): 182-94; Kell, Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, p. 63.
62 Van Klinken, "The Battle for History," p. 339.
63 For example Commander of the Bukit Barisan military command, Major General Abdul Rahman Ghafar, 
in late 1999 said that a majority of the Acehnese would choose independence if offered a referendum: 
"Ulama Sesalkan Presiden tak Kunjungi Aceh," Republika, November 12,1999.
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Universal Human Rights and the Refashioning of Acehnese Claims
It is partly in response to this predicament that many Acehnese nationalists have 
turned to an alternative range of arguments associated with universal human rights. 
The description of Acehnese suffering under Indonesia's repressive rule figures as a 
central theme in the discourse of a large variety of Acehnese political groups, ranging 
from GAM to NGOs which do not formally support self-determination. Most 
nationalist political activists (and many members of the Acehnese elite who do not 
openly endorse independence) will, when questioned, cite the brutality of the 
Indonesian army as the main reason why Aceh should seek its independence.
When Acehnese groups discuss military abuses, they increasingly do so in the 
idiom of the developing international human rights discourse. Human rights 
organizations have proliferated in Aceh since 1998, and international human rights 
NGOs and other agencies have shown an increased interest in Aceh during the same 
period. What's more, events leading up to the referendum in East Timor demonstrated 
the power and efficacy of international humanitarian intervention. These developments 
have combined to inject acute awareness of the international context into 
contemporary Acehnese discussions of military abuses. Newspaper reports of 
violations are peppered with references to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and other relevant instruments. Acehnese human rights activists have appeared before 
the UN Sub-commission on Human Rights in Geneva, and cooperated with the major 
international human rights NGOs. NGOs, student groups, and GAM routinely mold 
their condemnations of abuses in a way intended to appeal to UN and other 
international agencies. To cite one example: taking a lesson from the international 
response to the Yugoslav civil wars and the Rwandan genocide, Acehnese activists 
now frequently accuse the Indonesian state of carrying out racial discrimination, ethnic 
cleansing (pembersihan etnis), and even genocide against the Acehnese "ethnic group" 
(hence the growing use of the English-derived terms etnis and etnik, rather than the 
hitherto popular and more obviously nationalist bangsaj.64
As noted above, especially since the Yugoslav and Soviet dissolutions, and 
coinciding with the greater international prominence of universal human rights, some 
philosophers and other writers have promoted a "remedial theory of secession." They 
argue in favor of extending the right of self-determination beyond the colonial context, 
to cases of extreme discrimination, genocide, or some other abuse of the population. In 
such cases, it is argued, the state has lost the moral right to govern. Tamara Dragadze 
notes that some secessionist movements (she refers to that in Chechnya) frame their 
claims in this way.65
Since the public exposure of Suharto-era military abuses in 1998-1999, some 
Acehnese writers and activists have adopted this kind of argument. Many unaffiliated 
intellectuals, younger activists outside GAM ranks, and members of the provincial 
political elite do not accept, or at least do not emphasize, the successor-state argument
^  See for example, "Buffer Aksi Jeumpa Mirah Gelar Unjuk Rasa Damai di Banda Aceh," Analisa, May 3, 
2001.
65 Tamara Dragadze, "Self-determination and the politics of exclusion," Ethnic and Racial Studies 19,2 
(1996): 341-351, esp. 347.
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that Indonesian sovereignty over Aceh was illegal from the start.66 Instead, they argue 
that even if the Acehnese population gave voluntary assent to incorporation with 
Indonesia, such a voluntary union should not necessarily be permanently binding, but 
might be invalidated if the state forfeits its moral authority to rule. In the burgeoning 
Indonesian/Acehnese literature on the "Aceh problem," one frequently encounters the 
argument that Aceh's early loyalty to the Republic has been repaid with violence and 
that this betrayal accounts for the growth of secessionist sentiment.67 Writers often 
employ a marriage metaphor: after many years of enduring deceitful and violent 
treatment, the Acehnese "wife" has valid cause to seek a divorce from the Indonesian 
"husband."68 Such arguments imply a contractual understanding of state sovereignty, 
whereby sovereignty is viewed as residing with the people in the form of political 
consent, which may be withdrawn. The important point is that some activists, taking 
the logical next step, argue that this betrayal of trust is grounds for self- 
determination.69
A shift in paradigm is thus apparent in the character of the political demands 
made by groups outside of GAM. The core demand advanced by various youth and 
student organizations, like SIRA, has been for a referendum that includes an 
independence option. This is not presented as a non-negotiable demand for recognition 
of an eternal Acehnese sovereignty, but rather as a democratic and just method to 
resolve the conflict in Aceh by determining the aspirations of the population.70 In the 
words of Muhammad Nazar, Coordinator of SIRA, the ideological conflict between the 
two warring sides in Aceh has given rise to "political stagnation":
The military is given authority by the Government to say that Aceh is a part of 
the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia that must be maintained until the 
last drop of blood. Meanwhile, the Free Aceh Movement, which was proclaimed 
by Hasan Tiro in 1976, says that Aceh is not a part of Indonesia, meaning that 
Aceh must oppose every act of intervention and colonialism by other states. The 
consequences are certain, namely that the civilian population shed their blood, 
their tears, and lose their possessions. Shall we let this occur? . .  . the people of
66 James Siegel notes that many students who favor independence show little interest in Hasan di Tiro's 
views. See James Siegel, "Possessed," in The Rope of God, 2nd ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2000), pp. 336-442, esp. 362.
67 See for example Al-Chaidar, Sayed Mudhahar Hamid, and Yarmen Dinamika, Aceh Bersimbah Darah: 
Mengungkap Status Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM) di Aceh 1989 -  1998 (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kaustar, 
1999).
68 During the August 2000 People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Pemusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) 
session in Jakarta, at which the author was present, Ghazali Abbas Adnan, an outspoken Acehnese member 
of the Islamic-based United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) made this point in an 
interruption of proceedings. He condemned the body's lack of interest in Aceh's plight and suggested that the 
Acehnese viewed the relationship between Aceh and the central government as being like that between a 
husband and wife. At the outset of the "marriage" in 1945, the Acehnese hoped for a "husband" who would 
love and respect them. Instead, they have been abused and had their possessions stolen. In such 
circumstances, he argued, "many thought" it was appropriate for the Acehnese "wife" to divorce her 
husband.
69 See comments by student activists in "Mahasiswa Aceh Tuntut PBB Dukung Referendum di Aceh," 
Kompas, March 23,1999.
70 See for example "SIRA: Referendum Bukan Separatis," Wnspadn, June 191999.
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Aceh are committed to a comprehensive peace process, which can only be 
achieved via the implementation of a referendum.
Moreover, according to Nazar, self-determination is a "part of universal human 
rights recognized by UN resolutions, international law, and the Geneva convention." A 
referendum is "not a separatist movement and is never in contravention of any law 
w h atso ev er."71 Even if the sympathies of most of their members are with 
independence, therefore, groups like SIRA in fact call for a choice between 
reaffirmation, re-negotiation, or cancellation of the political contract between the 
Acehnese population and Jakarta.
Of course, an emphasis on human rights abuses can and does coincide with claims 
for historic sovereignty. Depiction of the brutality of Indonesian rule occupies a central 
place in GAM discourse, where it is used to illustrate and bolster arguments about the 
invalidity of Indonesian colonial control. GAM leaders are extremely reluctant to base 
their arguments on moral grounds alone, however, and are generally adamant that the 
successor state principle remains central.72 In their view, complaints focused on 
economic exploitation and military repression constitute an insufficient foundation for 
an appeal for independent statehood. This is because both problems are, at least in 
theory, amenable to solutions within the framework of the Indonesian state. One GAM 
spokesperson told the author that "If we just based our claims on human rights, then 
the Indonesian government could offer to resolve the human rights abuses. That would 
be the end of it. How could we establish an independent Aceh like that?"73
This view accurately reflects the existing international consensus on self- 
determination. Dragadze notes that an argument for independence based on the loss of 
a moral right to rule " . . .  does not fit easily into the coveted UN schemata based as 
they are not on morality but on the legal principles of territorial sovereignty and the 
indivisibility of sovereign states."74 Even so, there are indications that a change is also 
taking place within GAM. After the upsurge of pro-referendum activity in Aceh in 
1999, this organization shifted its position; where before it had rejected the proposal 
for a referendum (why have a referendum if Aceh had always been an independent 
state?), now it gave qualified support to such a proposition, so long as the referendum 
was conducted by the United Nations.75
71 These quotations are from Muhammad Nazar, "Satu Tahun Perjuangan Damai Referendum Aceh, Menuju 
Perdamaian dan Penyelesaian Menyeluruh," speech delivered at the Baiturrahman Mosque, Banda Aceh, 
February 4, 2000.
72 Interviews conducted in Banda Aceh, January- February 2001.
73 Interview with Nashiruddin bin Ahmad, GAM representative on the Komite Bersama Modalitas 
Keamanan (Joint Committee for Security Modalities), the body established in mid-2000 to oversee the 
ceasefire between GAM and the Indonesian security forces. Interview January 30,2001.
74 Dragadze, "Self-determination," p. 347.
75 See for example, "Exiled Aceh Leader Wants UN To Hold Referendum," Associated Press, December 2, 
1999.
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Global Civil Society and the Search for Alternatives
Another way in which the impact of globalization and the changing tenor of 
international relations has been felt in Aceh has been through the reach of global civil 
society into the territory. As noted above, many authors have argued that the new 
transnational networks of civil society have begun to play an important role in 
bypassing and subverting national boundaries, even in pointing the way to a post- 
Westphalian global order that transcends state sovereignty. In Hardt and Negri's 
phrase, organizations like NGOs may collectively be understood as a global civil 
society, "channeling the needs and desires of the multitude within the functioning of 
global power structures."76 Certainly, the major transnational human rights NGOs, like 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have played an important role in the 
Aceh conflict, with their reports on human rights abuses regularly translated into 
Indonesian and circulated widely in the territory. The symbolic power of such 
organizations has been demonstrated in recent times when Indonesian military 
spokespersons have sometimes taken to citing Human Rights Watch reports on abuses 
by GAM in order to bolster their own claims that military action is necessary to uphold 
law and order in Aceh.77 Lobbying by such bodies (as well as by groups formed by the 
Acehnese diaspora, like the US-based International Forum for Aceh) has garnered 
some attention for the Acehnese cause in important foreign policy-making institutions, 
such as the US Congress.
The most important sign of the influence of global civil society in Aceh, however, 
has been the rapid growth of local NGOs, which began in the early 1990s and 
accelerated after the end of the Suharto regime. According to one account, there were 
more than two hundred NGOs in the territory by mid-2000, with many of the newer 
organizations having an explicit human rights focus.78 While it is true that these NGOs 
responded to local conditions and were created and staffed by local activists, the 
growth of NGOs in Aceh cannot be understood purely by reference to the Indonesian, 
let alone the Acehnese, context. Such bodies have been strongly influenced by a 
multiplicity of linkages with major international funding agencies. Some of these 
linkages are direct, while others connect via major Jakarta-based NGOs and networks; 
ultimately their funding derives from international sources. Especially in the years after 
Suharto's fall, Acehnese human rights, humanitarian, women's, and other NGOs 
enjoyed a boom in international support, as part of the general increase in "democracy 
aid" for Indonesia's civil society. The Acehnese NGO sector became a partial check on 
the activities of the Indonesian state, especially by documenting, publicizing, and 
criticizing military abuses (such that military officers privately refer to the major NGOs 
as being part of the GAM "clandestine front"). Their efforts to expose and publicize 
these abuses were facilitated by the greater media freedom established in the territory 
after the end of the New Order regime. At the same time, such organizations provided 
an alternative to the nationalist pole represented by GAM. Although many 
participants in the local NGO networks privately sympathize with the independence 
cause, officially these organizations have nothing to say on the question of sovereignty,
76 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 311.
77 See for example, "Dunia Pantau Aksi Kekerasan di Aceh," Serambi Indonesia, June 8,2001.
78 Tabrani Yunis, Kelahiran dan Perkembangan LSM di Aceh, paper presented to seminar on "Wawasan 
Tentang LSM Indonesia: Sejarah, Perkembangan, Serta Prospeknya," Jakarta, August 2000, p. 10.
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and some have been critical of GAM methods. Indeed, the same international context 
which has so shaped GAM's claims has prevented Acehnese NGOs from demanding 
independence. Their reliance on large international donors has obstructed expressions 
of sympathy for GAM, as such expressions would result in immediate termination of 
grants.79
The emergence of this civil society fueled a search for alternatives between the two 
contested sovereignties of GAM and the Indonesian state, even if such alternatives 
have thus far been vaguely formulated. From early in the post-Suharto period, some 
participants in local NGOs promoted a peace process as a means to create a breathing 
space between these two apparently irreconcilable nationalisms, a space from which 
new political possibilities for Aceh could be imagined.80 In early 2000, negotiations did 
begin between the two sides, resulting in a "humanitarian pause" that temporarily 
suspended hostilities between GAM and the Indonesian security forces from June 2000. 
Although this process was initiated by Indonesia's President Abdurrahman Wahid 
and was negotiated between GAM and the Indonesian government, it may in some 
respects be understood as a project of global civil society. This was most obviously 
because of the role played by the Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, a 
Geneva-based NGO that acted as the principal mediator during the process, 
facilitating high-level negotiations in Geneva, establishing an office for ongoing dialogue 
in Banda Aceh and establishing a set of committees to oversee and monitor the Pause. 
A broad range of foreign government agencies, transnational NGOs, UN organizations, 
and local, but globally connected, NGOs swung in behind the peace process. They 
provided funding, as well as infrastructural and personnel support, for the various 
monitoring and other committees established under the Pause. In addition, they offered 
humanitarian assistance for victims of violence and aid for rebuilding shattered 
communities, intensified human rights monitoring, encouraged broad-based civil 
society participation in the process, and provided many other forms of support.
Despite a promising beginning and early optimism, by early 2001 the peace process 
was in disarray. Violence had resumed, reaching its worst level since at least the early 
1990s. Many major international humanitarian and other agencies were pulling out of 
the province. In July 2001, Indonesian security forces registered their disdain for the 
process by arresting all the main Banda Aceh-based GAM negotiators. A detailed 
examination of the reasons for the failure of the process cannot be attempted here, 
although both parties share some blame.81 GAM attempted to take advantage of the 
Pause by consolidating its de facto political control over much of rural Aceh and 
expanding its armed forces. At least some units affiliated with the organization also 
continued to attack Indonesian military forces and participate in extortion and similar 
actions. The more serious obstacle to the peace process, however, was the inability of 
Indonesia's central government to assert authority over its security forces and prevent 
them from taking offensive action against GAM and, often, the civilian population. The
79 Some funding agencies have anxiously sent observers to NGO workshops they support in Aceh to ensure 
that no support is given to the secessionist cause. My thanks to Marcus Mietzner for this point.
80 Interview with Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, June 1999.
81 For one attempt at detailed assessment of the humanitarian pause, see the second half of Edward 
Aspinall, "Aceh, self-determination and the international community," paper presented to "Autonomy and 
Disintegration in Indonesia" conference, La Trobe University, Melbourne, July 7-8,2001.
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drawn-out crisis in Abdurrahman Wahid's government, which coincided with the early 
stages of the peace process, exacerbated the problem. Senior officers became 
increasingly openly disdainful of the very idea of a peace process involving 
"separatists," and security operations were initiated ever more openly, and brutally.
Behind such immediate causes of the breakdown lay deep differences in how the 
two sides perceived the process, and their continuing irreconcilable positions on 
sovereignty. While GAM negotiators always made clear that their goal was Acehnese 
independence, Indonesian negotiators, as well as government and military 
spokespeople, were equally adamant that talks must remain "within the framework of 
the unitary state." From the start, concerns were expressed from deep within the 
Indonesian political and military establishment that even entering into negotiations 
with GAM in a foreign country and with foreign, even if non-governmental, mediation 
might be interpreted as tantamount to recognition of equal sovereignty. At every step 
of the process, Indonesian officials made it clear that their primary concern was to 
avoid "internationalizing" the Aceh issue and making symbolic concessions on 
sovereignty.82 GAM spokespersons, on the other hand, always argued in favor of 
greater involvement by the international community, especially the UN, in the peace 
process, viewing this as a crucial step toward achieving long overdue international 
recognition of Acehnese demands.83
Conclusion
Acehnese nationalism cannot be viewed as a movement constituted and structured 
merely in response to domestic conditions. Its character has also been formed, in quite 
fundamental ways, through a process of interaction with the international system. 
Precisely because nationalist movements, especially secessionist ones, aspire to 
membership in the international community of nation-states, international doctrines 
and norms exercise a deep influence on them. We might say that nationalist 
movements are Janus-faced not only because they look back to a golden past and 
forward to a glorious future, as Naim suggests, but also because they look both 
inward, toward the collectivity that comprises the nation, and outward, toward the 
community of nations which they aspire to join.84
Acehnese nationalists have taken particular care to craft their claims for 
independent statehood so that they would fit inside the dominant international 
discourse on self-determination and national sovereignty. Sensitivity to international 
norms is one factor that accounts for the secessionists' emphasis on Aceh's pre­
colonial history and their denial of Aceh's historical incorporation as part of 
Indonesia. This reliance on the concept of historic sovereignty has in turn shaped other 
elements of the Acehnese nationalist agenda, including the form of the future state to 
be adopted.
82 For one such example, see "Mimpi, Libatkan Negara Ketiga Selesaikan Aceh/' Serambi Indonesia, 
November 28,2001.
83 See for example, "GAM Desak Tim Intemasional ke Aceh," Kompas, June 7,2001; "Soal Aceh, Pemerintah 
Tetap Utamakan Dialog," Media Indonesia, August 18,2001.
84 Tom Naim, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London: New Left Books, 1977).
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Over the last decade, the growth of international human rights discourse and 
associated growth of global civil society has also exerted an influence on Acehnese 
nationalism. Some Acehnese groups, especially those consisting of younger activists, 
while retaining the basic goal of independence, have responded by foregrounding 
rights-based arguments for self-determination. By doing so, they changed the goal of 
independence from a non-negotiable demand for restitution of historic sovereignty, 
based on the principle of rectificatory justice, to something which was more contingent 
and contextual, leaving open the possibility of negotiation, compromise, and pursuit of 
a resolution by democratic means.
Such a possibility was also suggested by the agents of global civil society as they 
intervened in the Aceh conflict, standing aside from the two contested sovereignties of 
GAM and the Indonesian state, hinting at possibilities for a world where state- 
sovereignty was no longer the supreme organizing principle. When the peace process 
failed, however, that failure unavoidably suggested that state sovereignty in its classic 
form retained its supremacy and emotive power. The suffering of the Acehnese 
population in the years since 1998 also bears testimony to the devastation which may 
be wrought when two of sovereignty's offspring—the principles of national self- 
determination and the territorial integrity of nation-states—come into conflict.
